HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT
Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013
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Cover Image: Satellite imagery from December 2012, commissioned by Amnesty International USA and provided by DigitalGlobe, shows likely LRA camps within the Kafia Kingi enclave. © DigitalGlobe 2013
METHODOLOGY

This report was written by The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative (The Resolve). It was co-produced by The Resolve, the Enough Project, and Invisible Children. The Resolve, with assistance from the Enough Project and Invisible Children, collected information contained in this report from a variety of sources, including firsthand interviews with former members of the LRA who were eyewitnesses to LRA activity in the Kafia Kingi enclave. In total, report co-producers reviewed testimonies from eight former LRA combatants or abductees who provided eyewitness accounts of LRA activity in Kafia Kingi and five who provided evidence of the LRA’s collaboration with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) between 2009 and 2013. Extensive information was also collected from a review of existing literature on the LRA crisis and recorded interviews with former LRA members.

Additional interviews were conducted with civil society leaders in LRA-affected areas; representatives from the United Nations and the African Union; and representatives from regional governments and military forces. Most interviews were conducted by The Resolve during trips taken between March 2010 and April 2013 to Sam Ouandja, Obo, and Djemah in the Central African Republic (CAR); Yambio, Nzara, and Raga in South Sudan; Dungu and Banda in Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo); and Gulu and Kampala in Uganda.

Satellite imagery analysis of likely LRA activity in the Kafia Kingi enclave was commissioned by Amnesty International USA’s Science for Human Rights program and conducted by DigitalGlobe from February to April 2013 and included imagery from 2009 to 2013.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A growing body of evidence indicates that from 2009 until at least early 2013 the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group has periodically operated in the Kafia Kingi enclave, one of the disputed areas on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The enclave is currently controlled by Sudan, and numerous eyewitness reports indicate that elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Kafia Kingi have actively sheltered senior LRA commanders there and provided them with limited material support.

According to LRA defectors and other sources, LRA leader Joseph Kony himself first traveled to the Kafia Kingi enclave in 2010. He returned to Kafia Kingi in 2011 and was present there throughout parts of 2012. Along with other senior LRA commanders, he found safe harbor in a series of semipermanent encampments on the banks of the Umbelasha River near the SAF barracks in Dafak. During that time, Kony continued to direct LRA attacks against civilians in neighboring countries and issue new orders for LRA fighters. The LRA abandoned the camps in early 2013 but may remain active in the enclave.

Sudan’s harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi enclave was the latest upswing in a cycle of opportunistic collaboration between the two parties that dates back to 1994. The military training, safe haven, weapons, and supplies the Sudanese government provided to the LRA were critical to the group’s growth into an increasingly deadly rebel force. By 2004, Sudanese support had waned, leading to a period of prolonged disengagement before the LRA reestablished contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi in 2009.

The LRA’s ability to operate in Kafia Kingi with Sudanese support poses a severe threat to regional and international efforts to defeat the rebel group. Ugandan-led forces authorized by the African Union (AU) and assisted by military advisers from the United States (US) to pursue the LRA do not have permission to enter Kafia Kingi. So long as Sudan permits it, the small enclave can serve as a periodic safe haven for Kony and other senior LRA officers. Recent political upheaval in the Central African Republic (CAR), where rebels overthrew the previous government, has further destabilized the northeastern region of the country that borders Kafia Kingi and has made the enclave even more attractive for LRA commanders adept at exploiting ungoverned spaces.

This dynamic jeopardizes progress made in the past twelve months against the LRA, which includes a spike in LRA combatant defections and the capture or killing of two senior LRA commanders in CAR. Unless addressed, it will also enable LRA leaders to outlast current counter-LRA operations. Though international diplomats and military officials working to stop LRA attacks privately acknowledge recent LRA movement in Kafia Kingi, they have not adopted realistic strategies to prevent further support from Sudan to Kony’s forces.

In the absence of effective diplomacy, Sudanese government officials have refused to cooperate fully with regional counter-LRA initiatives and have denied allegations of the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi with impunity. Sudan, however, may not be as invested in its relationship with the LRA as it once was. No evidence has emerged showing that the SAF’s recent support to the LRA included significant new arms or that Sudanese officials have actively sought to employ the group again as a proxy force to destabilize South Sudan.

The LRA’s recent departure from its established camps in Kafia Kingi provides international diplomats with an opportunity to convince the Sudanese government to definitively end its decades-long collaboration with the LRA. The AU, which launched an initiative to facilitate regional cooperation to combat the LRA in
November 2011 and is mediating ongoing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, is best positioned to lead an international effort to press Sudan to fully cooperate with regional counter-LRA efforts. AU officials should work with the United Nations (UN) and governments of other LRA-affected countries to forge a common diplomatic strategy aimed at preventing further support from Sudan to the LRA and securing Sudan’s cooperation to apprehend Kony and other LRA members who may still be active in Sudanese-controlled territory.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Sudan:

- Work with the AU to apprehend LRA elements present in Sudanese-controlled territory and turn them over to appropriate authorities from their countries of origin.

To AU Chairperson Dr. Dlamini Zuma:

- Work with the AU Peace and Security Council, the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the AU Special Envoy for the LRA Issue, and leaders of LRA-affected countries to develop a common diplomatic strategy aimed at securing Sudan’s cooperation in directly addressing the LRA’s presence in territory under its control and/or Sudan’s authorization for forces authorized under the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) to conduct operations within Sudanese-controlled territory.

To members of the AU Peace and Security Council:

- Request a briefing from the AU Commission about evidence that the LRA, which the Council has declared a terrorist organization, has periodically maintained a presence in Sudanese-controlled territory since 2009.

- Demand Sudan’s cooperation in eliminating the LRA threat and express support for action by the Chairperson of the AU Commission to secure such cooperation in the upcoming reauthorization of the RCI-LRA in May 2013.

To the AU Special Envoy for the LRA Issue Ambassador Francisco Madeira:

- Work with the UN and governments participating in the AU RCI-LRA to collect evidence of the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi and its links to the Sudanese government, including through interviews with former LRA members, to be shared with UN and AU officials.

- Engage Sudanese officials more regularly on this issue and develop incentives for Sudan to cooperate with the RCI-LRA.

To UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon:

- Provide recommendations to the Security Council on how to address the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi in the upcoming report to the UN Security Council on implementation of the UN regional strategy on the LRA.

To UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of the Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) Abou Moussa:

- Coordinate efforts by relevant UN agencies and peacekeeping missions to collect evidence of LRA activity in Kafia Kingi and links to the Sudanese government, including through interviews with former LRA members, to be shared with UN and AU officials.

To members of the UN Security Council:

- Call for Sudan’s direct cooperation in regional efforts to address the LRA threat and emphasize the need for action by the UN and AU to secure such cooperation in the next Security Council statement on the LRA crisis.

- Strengthen the mandate of the UN/AU Hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to include proactive investigations into LRA activity in Kafia Kingi and urge UNAMID to follow through on its existing mandate to monitor LRA activity in the area pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2063 (2012).

- Urge the UN’s Panel of Experts for Sudan and Group of Experts for the Democratic Republic of Congo to investigate SAF support
to the LRA and the LRA’s involvement with illegal poaching pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1591 (2005) and 1533 (2004).

To UNAMID:

- Conduct an immediate investigation into the LRA’s periodic presence within the Kafia Kingi enclave, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2063 (2012).

To the Government of South Sudan:

- Raise concern about the possibility of LRA movements across the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone between Sudan and South Sudan with the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, which is being established with assistance from the UN to investigate cross-border movements of illicit armed groups.

To the US, European Union (EU), and Sudan’s bilateral donors and partners:

- Press Sudan to immediately apprehend any LRA elements who enter territories under its control and to ensure that the LRA cannot find safe haven there.

- Press the Chairperson of the AU Commission to lead diplomatic efforts focused on securing Sudanese cooperation in regional counter-LRA efforts.

To the US:

- Promote recently announced rewards of up to five million dollars for information leading to the arrest of Joseph Kony and other senior LRA commanders in areas around the Kafia Kingi enclave, including through the rehabilitation of FM radio infrastructure in nearby communities of CAR and South Sudan.
Map: The LRA’s Long Road to Kafia Kingi
1986-2013

Legend
- International Boundary
- Administrative Division
- Community
- Selected Routes of LRA Movement

Note: This map does not seek to comprehensively or precisely represent all LRA movements between 1986 and 2013. The arrows give an approximate sense of select strategic movements by LRA groups that culminated in its periodic presence in Kafia Kingi between 2009 and 2013.

LRA area of operations: Since 2012, the LRA’s area of operations has included northeastern Congo, eastern CAR, and the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006 and has not committed an attack in South Sudan since September 2011.
TIMELINE: THE LRA’S LONG ROAD TO KAFIA KINGI
1986-2013

1986–1993: During a period of intense civil strife in Uganda, Joseph Kony launches the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda to oppose the National Resistance Movement government of Yoweri Museveni.

1994–2004: In 1994, the LRA makes a strategic decision to expand its operations and bases into neighboring South Sudan. In the following years, SAF personnel provide weapons and military training to LRA forces that operate primarily in South Sudan’s Central and Eastern Equatoria regions. LRA leader Joseph Kony regularly spends time at SAF outposts in Juba. Sudanese support to the LRA wanes by 2004.


December 2008: Ugandan-led Operation Lightning Thunder scatters LRA groups further west into Congo, as well as into South Sudan and southeastern CAR.

October 2009: Otto Agweng leads an LRA group through CAR and into Kafia Kingi. They meet with the SAF near Dafak and request renewed Sudanese support for the LRA.

Late 2010: Joseph Kony leads another LRA group into Kafia Kingi, which meets with the SAF near Dafak. Kony and his group then reportedly depart Kafia Kingi by December, leaving Capt. Otim Ferry in charge of a group of LRA fighters that remains near Dafak.

September–October 2010: LRA forces attack eight communities in northeastern CAR and reportedly bring looted goods to LRA camps in Kafia Kingi.


January 2013: Ugandan troops kill LRA commander Vincent Binansio “Binany” Okumu and one of Kony’s bodyguards in CAR near the border with Kafia Kingi. Items recovered in the clash help confirm the suspected location of Kony’s camp in Kafia Kingi.

February–March 2013: According to satellite imagery analysis and other sources, the LRA abandons its established camps in Kafia Kingi.
## I. THE LRA’S HISTORIC ALLIANCE WITH SUDAN

Sudan’s harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi enclave is the latest upswing in a cycle of opportunistic collaboration between the two parties. Sudanese support to the LRA began in 1994, and for the next several years the military training, safe haven, weapons, and supplies the Sudanese government provided to the LRA were critical to the group’s growth into a deadly rebel force.\(^1\) The relationship soured between 1999 and early 2002 but then regained strength. By 2004, Sudanese support had again waned, leading to a period of prolonged disengagement before the LRA reestablished contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi in 2009.

### 1994–1998: The formation of the alliance

The LRA originated in the late 1980s as one of several rebel groups from northern Uganda struggling against the National Resistance Movement government of President Yoweri Museveni. Just as it did for previous rebel movements in northern Uganda, neighboring South Sudan provided an opportunity to escape Ugandan military pressure, access weapons markets, and establish opportunistic political and military alliances.\(^2\)

LRA fighters were first reported in South Sudan’s Eastern Equatoria region in 1991, which at the time was embroiled in a complex conflict that included the SAF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and its splinter factions, and Sudanese government-supported militias such as the Equatorial Defense Force (EDF).\(^3\) The conflict also had a regional dimension, with the Sudanese government providing support for the LRA while Uganda provided support for the SPLA.

The EDF helped facilitate the first contact between the LRA and Sudan, which shared a common enemy in the Ugandan government.\(^4\) The Sudanese government viewed the LRA as a potentially important proxy force that could fight SPLA rebels and destabilize Uganda. By 1994 the LRA had established a presence in South Sudan and was attacking and abducting civilians there.\(^5\)

Sudan provided extensive support to the LRA, providing them with food, medical supplies, ammunition, and weapons, including automatic rifles, anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and mortars.\(^6\) SAF officers also conducted military training for LRA combatants, both in LRA bases and at SAF outposts in Juba and Khartoum.\(^7\) LRA forces used their training in joint attacks with Sudanese troops on SPLA strongholds.\(^8\) SAF training included search-and-destroy tactics used on civilian targets, techniques still in use by the LRA today.\(^9\)

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\(^3\) Specifically, the SAF reportedly supplied the LRA with the following weapons: Russian-made 82 mm illuminating mortars, Russian-made SPG9 73 mm caliber recoilless guns, Hechler & Koch G3 7.62 mm battle rifles, anti-aircraft guns (12.7mm), anti-personnel mines, SAM7 missiles, RPG7s, and B10 recoilless rifles. Cakaj, Ledio, “The Lord's Resistance Army of Today,” Enough Project, November 2010. Lancaster, Philip, Guillaume Lacaille, and Ledio Cakaj, “Diagnostic Study of the Lord's Resistance Army,” International Working Group on the LRA, World Bank, June 2011.
\(^4\) The SAF trained the LRA in ambush, search-and-destroy, trench-clearing, and other tactics. For more on the SAF’s training of LRA fighters that included sending LRA fighters to Khartoum, see Lancaster, Lacaille, Cakaj, “Diagnostic Study,” 2011; and Schomerus, “The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan,” 2007.
\(^5\) The LRA also reportedly clashed with Ugandan forces in South Sudan. Ugandan forces were not officially given permission to operate there until 2002 but were observed in South Sudan as early as 1997. Though tasked with fighting the LRA, Ugandan forces were implicated in numerous human rights abuses against South Sudanese civilians there. Schomerus, “The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan,” 2007.

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1 Throughout this report, “Sudan” is used to refer to both the territory and government of what is currently the Republic of Sudan. To avoid confusion, “South Sudan” is used to refer to the territory of what is now the Republic of South Sudan, as well as to both the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan, functional between 2005 and 2011, and the government of the current Republic of South Sudan.


3 Ibid.
The LRA also established bases and controlled territory in Eastern Equatoria. Soon after arriving there, they established a sizeable base at Aru Junction, which the SPLA reportedly overran in 1997. Following this, Kony and Otti fled to the safety of Sudan’s military presence in Juba, which they had periodically visited since 1994. Under the protection of the Sudanese military, the LRA established a new base near Juba at Lubanga-tek.

1999–2004: The alliance tested

Though Sudanese support to the LRA peaked as early as 1996, the 1999 Nairobi Agreement between the Sudanese and Ugandan governments marked the beginning of a particularly tumultuous period that tested the Sudan-LRA alliance. The agreement, brokered by the Carter Center, stipulated that neither government would support the other’s rebel forces.

Though neither Uganda nor Sudan immediately honored the agreement, it strained relations between Khartoum and the LRA. The US decision to list the LRA as a “terrorist organization” in 2001 provided further incentive for Khartoum to distance itself from the LRA.

In late 2001, running low on supplies and increasingly estranged from its former allies, the LRA began to shift from its bases near Juba and move towards the Imatong Mountains in Eastern Equatoria. They looted food from communities along the way, displacing hundreds of families.

In March 2002, the Sudanese government gave permission for Ugandan troops to enter South Sudan to pursue the LRA. Dubbed Operation Iron Fist, the subsequent Ugandan military offensive succeeded in destroying several bases, including the ones at Lubanga-tek, but LRA forces had already fled the area and escaped without sustaining significant losses to their top command structure.

The LRA responded to Operation Iron Fist with an intensive period of violence in South Sudan. Between April and June 2002, the LRA attacked several Sudanese military camps near Juba. The LRA also attacked communities in areas controlled by the Sudanese military as well as the EDF, further straining their relationships with both groups. In one particularly brutal series of attacks, LRA forces killed hundreds of South Sudanese in the Imatong Mountains in late April and early May 2002. These attacks included the massacre of as many as 350 civilians, mostly women, children, and the elderly, near the town of Katire in late April.

Operation Iron Fist also sparked a return of LRA violence to northern Uganda, where the group returned in force in June 2002 and began attacking civilian and humanitarian targets. Civil society leaders from northern Uganda reacted to the escalating violence by reaching out to LRA leaders in an attempt to spark negotiations. After some initial progress, the LRA’s willingness to engage faltered. The breakdown coincided with reports that the Sudanese government was rebuilding its alliance with the LRA and providing weapons and ammunition to the rebel group.

In 2004, Ugandan peace negotiator Betty Bigombe rekindled efforts to negotiate with LRA commanders. She secured permission from the Sudanese government to visit Joseph Kony without sustaining significant losses to their top command structure.15

11 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 The Ugandan government responded by forcing northern Ugandans, who had experienced several years of relative calm, into displacement camps, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis caused by the LRA’s return.
19 Sudanese officials allegedly met with LRA commanders, including Kony, at Nisitu in South Sudan in July 2002 and provided the LRA with military supplies. The LRA then, with the EDF, participated in the SAF’s assault on the SPLA base in Torit in October 2002. See International Crisis Group, “Northern Uganda,” 2004; and Human Rights Watch, “Abducted and Abused,” 2003. However, some reports indicate that while the EDF assisted the SAF in capturing Torit, the LRA did not. Schomerus, “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan,” 2007.
at his base in South Sudan, but the Sudanese military intelligence later refused to allow her to see him.20

2005–2008: The LRA in transition

Despite continued protection from Sudanese forces, by 2005 the LRA’s ability to operate in South Sudan was growing increasingly tenuous. In 2004, the EDF and SPLA had merged and had begun joint operations against the LRA.21 In 2005, Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the SPLM/A. This agreement, which paved the way for South Sudan’s autonomy and eventual independence, guaranteed the eventual withdrawal of SAF forces from South Sudan. Despite this, the SAF continued to resupply the LRA from its bases in Juba and Torit into 2004 and 2005, and Kony maintained his camp in the Imatong Mountains.22

In August 2005, LRA forces crossed to the west side of the Nile River in South Sudan and over the next eighteen months largely abandoned their former strongholds in Eastern Equatoria. LRA forces not only moved into areas of South Sudan west of the Nile but also crossed the border into Congo to establish bases in the remote Garamba National Park in late 2005. Though the LRA largely refrained from attacking Congolese civilians, it terrorized communities west of the Nile in South Sudan, particularly in Western Equatoria State.

The SAF reportedly continued to give LRA fighters support after the CPA was signed and allowed them safe haven at SAF outposts in Juba in between their attacks west of the Nile.23 Despite the SAF’s continued links to the LRA, the relationship between the two allies grew increasingly rocky. In August 2005, the SAF reportedly abducted LRA fighters and sent them to Darfur, angering LRA commanders.24

In October 2005, Khartoum gave the UPDF permission to pursue the LRA north of the Juba-Torit road.25 In May 2006, Sudan withdrew most of its troops from Juba and surrounding areas, making it difficult for the SAF to transfer supplies to the LRA.

In April 2006, with neither the new South Sudanese military nor the Ugandan military able to stop continued LRA attacks, Riek Machar, the vice president of the newly autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS), met with Kony’s chief deputy, Vincent Otti, in an attempt to jump-start peaceful negotiations.26 This move initiated a series of steps that culminated in the launching of peace talks in July 2006 between the LRA and the Ugandan government, mediated by the GOSS.

Both the LRA and Ugandan government had fierce internal debates about whether to seriously pursue the negotiations process, and both parties broke ceasefire agreements first signed in August 2006.27 Within the LRA, Vincent Otti, Kony’s chief deputy, emerged as the most visible LRA officer engaging in the talks. Caesar Achellam, who had experience as a liaison to the SAF, lobbied internally for the LRA to rekindle its relationship with Sudan.28 In mid-2007 Kony marginalized Achellam after Otti accused him of taking money from Sudanese officials without telling Kony.29 However, LRA officers reportedly maintained contact with the SAF into 2007.30

29 Ibid.
30 Statements made by LRA commanders during the Juba peace talks indicated they were still in touch with Sudanese officials into 2007. See International Crisis
Dynamics within the LRA shifted considerably in October 2007 when Joseph Kony ordered the execution of Vincent Otti. Kony reportedly feared that Otti’s growing popularity within the LRA posed a threat to his control of the group. Following Otti’s death, Kony distanced himself further from the Juba talks and Achellam regained much of his influence within the LRA. Kony also marginalized some older LRA commanders, particularly those who had been close to Otti, while assigning more responsibility to younger, more loyal commanders such as Binany and Lt. Col. Otto Agweng. Kony also ordered the resumption of large-scale LRA raids on civilians, which began with the abduction of seventy-three people in Obo, CAR in March 2008 and continued with the abduction of over one hundred children near the Congolese towns of Duru and Kpaika in September of that year.

In December 2008, Ugandan troops launched Operation Lightning Thunder, a strike on LRA camps in Garamba meant to decisively defeat the rebel group. Kony and other LRA officers survived the botched operation, however, and carried out large-scale reprisal attacks against civilians in Congo and South Sudan, killing more than 865 people and abducting hundreds of others.

Ugandan military troops, authorized as part of a regional African Union mission since November 2011, have continued counter-LRA operations with US support since the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder. Deployed primarily in CAR, they have reduced the LRA’s numbers and succeeded in capturing or killing several senior commanders. However, the LRA has retained its capacity to terrorize civilians in Congo and CAR, abducting 517 people and committing 275 attacks in 2012 alone.

Group, “Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum,” 14 September 2007. Also, an LRA group active in southeastern CAR between January and March 2007 was reportedly tasked with receiving arms shipments sent by the SAF. Though it is not clear whether they received the shipments, any support received from the SAF at this time was likely very minimal. The Resolve email exchange with LRA expert, February 2013. International Crisis Group, “Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace,” 2007.

32 In December 2007, Kony reportedly issued orders to abduct one thousand civilians from South Sudan and CAR and to attack the SPLA in order to obtain weapons. The LRA abducted seventy people in CAR in March 2008 and attacked an SPLA base at Nabanga that June, killing twenty-one troops. The Resolve email exchange with LRA expert, March 2013.
33 The US helped Uganda secure agreement from Congo and South Sudan to allow Ugandan troops to launch operations in their territory, as well as dedicate limited troop capacity to the effort. The US dedicated a team of seventeen advisers and analysts and provided satellite phones, intelligence, and one million dollars in fuel to the Ugandan military for the assault on Garamba National Park. International Crisis Group, “LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony,” 28 April 2010.

The LRA has adapted remarkably well to Ugandan military operations since the collapse of the Juba peace talks, in particular by scattering into small groups, promoting commanders most loyal to Kony, and reducing large, conspicuous massacres. But perhaps the most effective adaptation the LRA has made since 2009 has been to quietly establish a periodic presence in the Kafia Kingi enclave. LRA fighters first entered the enclave and reestablished contact with the SAF in October 2009. The LRA then steadily expanded its presence in the enclave at least until early 2013, often using encampments there to shelter Joseph Kony and other senior LRA commanders. The areas of Kafia Kingi where the LRA established itself lie very close to Sudan’s South Darfur State, and LRA forces have reportedly entered that region as well.

At the very least, Kafia Kingi serves the LRA as a periodic safe haven from Ugandan forces authorized by the AU RCI-LRA. Some former LRA combatants even testify that Kony seeks to establish a more permanent presence in Kafia Kingi where LRA forces can seek asylum and even cultivate crops. Though the LRA had abandoned their established encampments in Kafia Kingi by March 2013, the area remains a potential safe haven for LRA groups to exploit.

II. LRA ACTIVITY IN AND NEAR KAFIA KINGI

The LRA has adapted remarkably well to Ugandan military operations since the collapse of the Juba peace talks, in particular by scattering into small groups, promoting commanders most loyal to Kony, and reducing large, conspicuous massacres. But perhaps the most effective adaptation the LRA has made since 2009 has been to quietly establish a periodic presence in the Kafia Kingi enclave. LRA fighters first entered the enclave and reestablished contact with the SAF in October 2009. The LRA then steadily expanded its presence in the enclave at least until early 2013, often using encampments there to shelter Joseph Kony and other senior LRA commanders. The areas of Kafia Kingi where the LRA established itself lie very close to Sudan’s South Darfur State, and LRA forces have reportedly entered that region as well.

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37 Unless otherwise noted, the use of “Kafia Kingi” in this paper refers to the Kafia Kingi enclave as a whole, not the town of Kafia Kingi.
38 For instance, LRA members have made periodic trips to the market town of Songo, which lies in South Darfur State near the border with Kafia Kingi. The Resolve interview with former LRA member, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. 39 Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from five former LRA members, December 2012. See also UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, “Letter dated 26 October 2010 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004),” UN Security Council, 26 October 2010.
Senior LRA commanders first considered traveling to Kafia Kingi or South Darfur to rekindle their alliance with Khartoum during the Juba peace talks. Kony tasked Okot Odhiambo and Achellam with key roles in initiating contact with the SAF. Achellam, who was a key liaison to the SAF when the LRA was active in South Sudan, helped to organize LRA delegations attempting to reach Kafia Kingi, both during the peace talks and after the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder.  

In July 2009, the LRA made one of its initial attempts to travel to Kafia Kingi. This LRA group made it into Western Bahr el-Ghazal in South Sudan, which borders Kafia Kingi, but turned back towards CAR after clashing with SPLA forces. By this time, senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Bok Abudema, had fled to southeastern CAR from Congo’s Garamba Park.

In September 2009, Otto Agweng led another LRA delegation composed of about thirty combatants who left CAR in an attempt to reestablish contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi. In October 2009, Agweng’s group succeeded in reaching Kafia Kingi. They made contact with the SAF garrison at Dafak, in northern Kafia Kingi, and established a temporary camp east of the garrison. Two LRA officers succeeded in establishing contact and delivering a letter from senior LRA commanders to the SAF. Representatives from the SAF garrison in Dafak and Sudanese military intelligence then met with the larger LRA delegation near their temporary camp. According to eyewitness testimony from two former LRA members, the SAF supplied the LRA with limited food as well as basic medical supplies for injured LRA fighters.

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41 One former LRA combatant testified that the LRA group left for Kafia Kingi in June, not July, 2009. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from two LRA escapees who attempted to travel to Kafia Kingi in July 2009, January 2010. LRA commander Charles Arop also defected in Congo in November 2009 and claimed that Kony had summoned him to CAR where they were to travel together to Darfur. The Resolve interview with UN official, Dungu, Congo, March 2010.

42 Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from two LRA escapees who attempted to travel to Kafia Kingi in July 2009, December 2012.

43 Most information about the LRA’s delegation to Kafia Kingi in October 2009 comes from two former LRA members who were part of that group. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from two former LRA members, January 2010.

44 References to “Dafak” in this report refer to the location near the Umbelasha River in the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave. Dafak is also spelled “Dafak,” “Daffak,” or “Dafag.” This location is different from “Um Dafok,” which lies in South Darfur State on the border of CAR. Analysts at DigitalGlobe identified the location of the SAF garrison at Dafak, seen in satellite imagery on page thirteen, based on previously conducted analysis. Opperman, Amy and DJ Mallman. “Reported LRA Presence in Kafia Kingi,” DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analysis commissioned by Amnesty International USA, January 2013. Image of Dafak garrison retrieved on 17 April 2012, from maps.google.com at +9° 34’ 18.58”, +24° 11’ 31.82”.

45 Two former LRA combatants who were part of this delegation testified that the two LRA officers who established initial contact with the SAF were then flown by helicopter to meet with senior SAF officials in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve in January 2010 from two former LRA members, January 2013.
The two parties discussed the possibility of the LRA using Kafia Kingi as a safe haven and the possibility of renewing their alliance, but the SAF representatives were noncommittal and stated they needed to discuss the matter with more senior officials before making any decision.47 The LRA soon left Kafia Kingi to return to CAR after arranging with the SAF to send another LRA delegation to Dafak and to keep the news of their first meeting confidential.48 Upon their return, Joseph Kony promoted Agweng and as many as five other members of the delegation.49

In December 2009, an LRA group attacked and looted Boro Medina, a small SPLA garrison town near Western Bahr el-Ghazal’s border with Kafia Kingi. Days later, SPLA forces claimed they clashed with the LRA group, killing four LRA members and losing one SPLA soldier.50 In early January 2010, a joint SPLA-UPDF force was tracking an LRA group led by Agweng, possibly the same group that had attacked Boro Medina and clashed with SPLA, as it moved north near Western Bahr el-Ghazal’s border with CAR. They believe the group traveled to Kafia Kingi, possibly with the help of the SAF, and maintained a presence in Kafia Kingi into early 2010.51

2010: Kony travels to Kafia Kingi

In late 2010, an LRA delegation led by Joseph Kony arrived in Kafia Kingi and made contact with the SAF garrison at Dafak. Kony himself did not meet with the SAF representatives but stayed nearby as LRA Capt. Otim Ferry coordinated the LRA’s interaction.52 The delegation split into several small groups upon leaving Kafia Kingi, while Kony tasked Ferry with remaining there and establishing a more permanent presence near Dafak. Ferry was left with a force of about twenty fighters.53

Kony’s trip into Kafia Kingi coincided with a period of intensified LRA attacks near the enclave. He reportedly ordered LRA fighters to get food from CAR to supply the delegation during its stay in Kafia Kingi.54 Between 3 September and 26 October 2010, LRA forces committed eight attacks in the adjacent Vakaga prefecture of CAR, abducting dozens of people and looting food and other supplies.55 During these raids, LRA groups clashed with several CAR rebel groups active in the area, which pursued the LRA attackers on several occasions. One of these groups, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), pursued an LRA raiding party until it crossed the border from CAR back into Kafia Kingi.56 Some attacks, such as an October 2010 raid on Birao in which the LRA abducted twenty-three people, may have been committed by splinter LRA groups returning from Kafia Kingi to CAR.57 Kony left Kafia Kingi to return to CAR in November or December 2010.58

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 Both the UPDF and SPLA report that a white helicopter with UN markings reportedly touched down near the group the tracking team was pursuing, supplied the LRA group with food, and possibly picked up members of the LRA. UPDF and SPLA officers believe that it was an SAF helicopter disguised as a UN helicopter that helped Agweng’s group reach Kafia Kingi. The Resolve interviews with Ugandan military officer, Sam Ouandja, Central African Republic, March 2010; LRA expert, Obo, Central African Republic, March 2010; and SPLA officer, Raga, October 2012
52 The Resolve interview with former LRA member who was in Kafia Kingi with Kony in late 2010, March 2013. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from former LRA member who was with Kony in Kafia Kingi in 2010, December 2012. Some sources, including the International Crisis Group, indicate the LRA delegation arrived in August 2010, while former LRA members who accompanied Kony said they arrived in September or October. AFP, “War crimes-accused LRA chief likely in Darfur: think tank,” 13 October 2010.
53 The Resolve interview with former LRA member who was in a group led by Ferry that was tasked with staying in Kafia Kingi, March 2013.
54 Ibid.
55 In addition to these attacks, LRA forces killed one man and abducted two girls near Raga in Western Bahr el-Ghazal in July 2010. Days later an LRA fighter defected after the LRA clashed with the Ugandan military. The Resolve interviews with civilians and South Sudanese officials, Raga and Yubulu, South Sudan, October 2012.
56 The Resolve interview with UFDR official, Sam Ouandja, 24 October 2012.
57 Birao is the capital of Vakaga prefecture. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from a former LRA member, December 2012. For more on the Birao attacks, see also International Crisis Group, “The Lord’s Resistance Army: End Game,” 17 November 2011.
2011: Kony returns to Kafia Kingi

In the summer of 2011, Kony summoned senior LRA commanders to a meeting in southeastern CAR. Continuing the trend seen following Otti’s execution, Kony reportedly further marginalized several officers who were older or whose loyalty was in question and vested more responsibility in younger LRA commanders he considered more loyal to him.59

Following the meeting, LRA forces led by Kony again traveled to Kafia Kingi.60 In September 2011, one group of LRA raided the town of Deim 59 The Resolve interviews with Ugandan military officials, Djemah, Central African Republic, 25 February 2012; Ugandan military official, Obo, 23 October 2012; and former LRA combatant, Obo, 23 October 2012.

60 The Resolve interviews with SPLA official, Raga, South Sudan; US officials, Washington, DC, US, October 2012.
Jallab in Raga County of Western Bahr el-Ghazal in an attack the SPLA believes was committed by an offshoot of Kony’s group as they traveled north back into Kafia Kingi.61

There the LRA delegation met with Capt. Otim Ferry, who had camped near the SAF garrison at Dafak since Kony’s previous visit in late 2010.62 During Kony’s absence, Ferry’s group had built several mud huts and maintained contact with Kony’s group via HF radio.63 During that time, Ferry’s group had also solidified its relationship with the SAF, which provided the LRA with food, medicine, and limited ammunition.64

Upon Kony’s arrival, the LRA established camps southwest of Dafak and began to cultivate crops.65 Analysis of satellite imagery from the area shows the emergence of likely LRA camps seventeen kilometers southwest of Dafak on the banks of the Umbelasha River. Indications of burned grassland and low scrub first appear in imagery from this location in November 2011. More definitive signs of human activity, six huts and other structures, appear in imagery from 18 March 2012.66 By late 2011, the size of the LRA contingent in Kafia Kingi had reportedly swelled to over one hundred people, including women and children.67

2012–2013: The LRA’s continued presence

Kony and other senior LRA commanders reportedly remained at their encampments in Kafia Kingi throughout much of 2012, though Kony may have also spent significant time in neighboring areas of northeastern CAR.68 In late 2012, one of Kony’s bodyguards, Okema, defected from the LRA and provided further confirmation of Kony’s presence in Kafia Kingi.69 Satellite imagery analysis from June through October 2012 of the likely LRA encampments shows the creation of additional structures in a complex that included a central camp and three outlying camps, as well as numerous crops. The combined camps covered approximately one-half of a square kilometer.70

In January 2013, Ugandan troops killed Binany, a Kony loyalist who had risen considerably in

61 The Resolve interview with SPLA official, Raga, September 2012.
62 At least two LRA combatants have testified that Ferry remained in Dafak after Kony left in late 2010. These include one LRA officer who escaped from Ferry’s group there in August 2011. The Resolve interview with former LRA member who was in a group led by Ferry that was tasked with staying in Kafia Kingi, March 2013. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from former LRA member who was in the group led by Ferry that was tasked with staying in Kafia Kingi, December 2012. The Resolve interview with LRA expert, Washington, DC, January 2013.
63 The Resolve interview with former LRA member who was in a group led by Ferry that was tasked with staying in Kafia Kingi, Kampala, March 2013. This LRA member defected from the LRA in August 2011, and later was taken into custody by authorities in CAR.
64 Ibid.
65 One of the most detailed reports of the existence and locations of these encampments and Kony’s personal presence in Kafia Kingi comes from the testimony of a mid-level LRA commander who was taken into custody by the SPLA in late 2011 near Boro Medina in Western Bahr el-Ghazal. In addition, the SPLA and the South Sudanese government officials claim to have independently verified the presence of LRA camps near Dafak, SAF collaboration with the LRA, and the LRA’s cultivation of crops in Kafia Kingi, as have refugees from the Dafak area who currently live in CAR but periodically travel back to Kafia Kingi. The Resolve interviews with SPLA and government officials, Raga and Wau, October 2012; refugees from Kafia Kingi, Sam Ouandja, October 2012; US officials, Washington, DC, October 2012; Ugandan military official, Djemah, 25 February 2012.
66 DigitalGlobe, “Farm Complex in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,” 10 April 2013, DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analysis commissioned by Amnesty International USA.
67 Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from former LRA member, December 2012.
68 The Resolve interview with Ugandan military official, Djemah, February 2012. The Resolve phone interview with LRA expert, March 2013. The SPLA believes that Odhiambo, as well as Ongwen, joined Kony in Kafia Kingi for a meeting in late May and early June 2012, indicating Kony may have been in Kafia Kingi into mid-2012. They believe that Odhiambo may have traveled with the SAF by helicopter to its base in Nyala. The Resolve interviews with SPLA and South Sudanese government officials, Raga and Wau, October 2012.
69 Okema reportedly defected after Kony punished him for sleeping with a woman intended to be Kony’s wife. The Resolve phone interview with LRA expert, March 2013. The Resolve interview with Ugandan military official, Obo, April 2013.
70 DigitalGlobe, “Farm Complex in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,” 10 April 2013, DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analysis commissioned by Amnesty International USA.
the LRA hierarchy since the Juba peace talks.\textsuperscript{71} Binany was the overall commander of LRA groups in Congo and may have been returning there at the time.

**LRA livelihoods in Kafia Kingi**

LRA forces are remarkably adept at surviving in harsh physical and geopolitical environments. Under the direction of experienced commanders, they quickly adapt to changing circumstances by utilizing a range of tactics that include looting, cultivation, securing external assistance, and petty trading.\textsuperscript{72} Unsurprisingly, the LRA employed all of these strategies in order to survive in Kafia Kingi, an unfamiliar territory far from their former strongholds in South Sudan’s Equatoria region and Congo’s Haut and Bas Uele districts.

Though Kafia Kingi has a more arid climate than most areas LRA groups have historically operated in, the enclave’s physical geography allowed LRA groups to live off the land to a certain extent. The Umbelasha River, which runs close to Dafak, as well as the location of the LRA’s likely encampments seventeen kilometers southwest of Dafak, provides access to water. Much of Kafia Kingi is covered by a wooded savannah that provides access to firewood, shelter, and game.\textsuperscript{73}

Traditionally, residents of the enclave have grown a wide variety of crops.\textsuperscript{74} Unsurprisingly, at least four former LRA combatants have testified to plans by senior LRA commanders to augment or even replace looting raids by cultivating crops in Kafia Kingi.\textsuperscript{75} Testimony from two former LRA combatants, as well as civilian and military sources in the region, indicates that the LRA succeeded in cultivating crops near their camps around Dafak.\textsuperscript{76} Satellite imagery of the likely location of the LRA encampments showed some cultivated farmland.\textsuperscript{77} The LRA has rarely relied on cultivation as a primary survival strategy, but it did cultivate extensive crops in Congo’s Garamba National Park during the Juba peace talks and at its camps near Juba during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{78}

Though the LRA has relied primarily on looting civilian communities to survive since the collapse of the Juba peace talks, LRA forces in Kafia Kingi established less antagonistic relations with local communities in Kafia Kingi. There have been no confirmed reports of LRA attacks on civilians in the Kafia Kingi enclave. This indicates that LRA forces there were careful to avoid straining their relationship with the SAF or drawing attention to their presence within the enclave.

Former LRA combatants and civilians have also testified that LRA forces went as far as to trade with local civilians in Kafia Kingi and nearby areas in South Darfur and northeastern CAR. In particular, LRA forces traveled to the market town of Songo, east of Dafak in Sudan’s South Darfur State, sometimes accompanied by SAF personnel.\textsuperscript{79} They then traded for goods such as seeds, millet, salt, and soap.\textsuperscript{80}

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\textsuperscript{74} Hassan, Mohammed, Gaboush, “Sustainable Utilization of Wildlife Resources In Radom Biosphere Reserve,” 2005.

\textsuperscript{75} DigitalGlobe, “Farm Complex in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,” 10 April 2013, DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analysis commissioned by Amnesty International USA. Debriefing notes viewed by The Resolve from four former LRA members, December 2012.

\textsuperscript{76} Civilians living in both South Sudan and CAR who have traveled to the Kafia Kingi enclave have reported that the LRA has a camp near Dafak and is cultivating crops there. The Resolve interview with SPLA, Raga, October 2012. The Resolve interviews with Sudanese refugees from Kafia Kingi currently living in CAR, 25 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{77} DigitalGlobe, “Farm Complex in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,” 10 April 2013, DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analysis commissioned by Amnesty International USA.


\textsuperscript{80} Some LRA members established relationships with people in Songo that went beyond pure commercial transactions. For instance, when one LRA combatant decided to defect in mid-2011, he went to a community
LRA forces in Kafia Kingi also traded with the SAF garrison, sometimes providing troops there with wild game. At the LRA’s request, the SAF also provided the LRA with food, medicine, and limited ammunition. Though SAF support has reportedly been cut off since early 2013, the off-again, on-again nature of collaboration between the SAF and LRA indicates that such support could resume in the future. However, no evidence has emerged indicating that the SAF provided LRA forces in Kafia Kingi with weapons.

Though the LRA did not loot civilian communities in Kafia Kingi, the survival of its forces there depended in part on looting communities in Congo and CAR. The LRA raids on communities in Vakaga prefecture in late 2010 demonstrate the LRA’s willingness to carry looted goods across long distances into Kafia Kingi. The LRA has also established several routes that wind through Congo and CAR and have been used regularly by LRA forces to traffic looted goods to LRA camps in Kafia Kingi and northeastern CAR.

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81 The Resolve interview with former LRA combatant, Kampala, March 2013.
82 The Resolve interview with former LRA combatant, Kampala, March 2013. Debriefing notes from four former LRA combatants viewed by The Resolve, January 2013.
83 A follow-up report written by the Enough Project and co-produced by The Resolve and Invisible Children will document the LRA’s involvement in elephant poaching and ivory harvesting.
84 One of these routes goes from Haut Uele district in Congo and follows the border between CAR and South Sudan into Kafia Kingi and northern CAR. The other route goes from Bas Uele district in Congo, passing through CAR near the Vovodo-Chinko river system and towns such as Zemio, Rafai, Bakouma, and Yalinga. In addition to looted goods, LRA forces could also bring cash looted from communities in CAR and Congo for use in market towns like Songo. Congolese francs and Central African CFA francs would likely have to be exchanged for local currency there. The Resolve interview with Ugandan military commander, Kampala, Uganda, March 2013. The Resolve interview with US Government official, Washington, DC, February 2013.
The LRA’s ability to find safe haven in Kafia Kingi poses a severe threat to the success of international efforts to stop LRA violence against civilians. Despite its failure so far to support these efforts, the recent departure of LRA fighters from their established Kafia Kingi camps and the SAF’s restraint from providing the group with weapons indicates Sudan could still play a productive role in ending the LRA crisis. For this to happen, the AU, supported by the UN and key donor partners such as the US and EU, must devise a mix of pressure and incentives to convince Khartoum to definitively end its decades-long relationship with the LRA.

The evolution of the counter-LRA coalition

Following the botched launch of Operation Lightning Thunder in December 2008, US-supported Ugandan military operations against the LRA in Congo and CAR succeeded in capturing or killing several key commanders and significantly reduced the LRA’s strength. However, Ugandan military operations slowed dramatically in 2010 and 2011 after the Ugandan government withdrew the bulk of Ugandan forces deployed to the region, and no LRA senior commanders were captured or killed over a two-year period. Cooperation between Uganda and the governments of CAR, Congo, and South Sudan also began to deteriorate. In particular, Congo forced the Ugandan counter-LRA forces to withdraw from Congolese territory in September 2011.

The international community gradually took greater initiative as regional cooperation broke down and it became clear the Ugandan military could not score a quick, clear defeat of the LRA. In November 2011, the African Union officially authorized the AU RCI-LRA, funded in part by the EU. This initiative included the appointment of an AU LRA envoy, Ambassador Francisco Madeira of Mozambique, and the authorization of an AU Regional Task Force (AU RTF) comprised of military forces from the four affected countries. The US government, which continued to provide logistics and intelligence support to Ugandan forces after the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder, augmented this assistance with the deployment of nearly one hundred US military advisers to assist counter-LRA forces, primarily the Ugandans, in October 2011.

In addition, the UN Security Council approved a regional LRA strategy in July 2012, mandating UNOCA head Abou Moussa to spearhead its implementation. The strategy encompasses the AU’s initiative to coordinate regional military efforts, as well as additional components focused on strengthening efforts to protect civilians, secure defections from LRA ranks, and deliver humanitarian assistance to affected communities.

Since mid-2012, these international counter-LRA efforts have resulted in some renewed momentum in reducing the LRA’s fighting capacity in the geographic areas where they are being implemented. In May 2012, Ugandan military forces captured Caesar Achellam, formerly a key liaison between the LRA and the SAF, on the CAR/Congo border. In the following six months, there was a spike in the number of Ugandan combatant defections from the LRA, in part due to efforts by US military advisers to encourage defections via leaflets, radio programs, and helicopter-mounted speaker broadcasts. Most recently, in January 2013, the Ugandan military’s killing of Binany struck a significant blow to the LRA command structure in Congo.

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87 Though Achellam’s influence within the LRA had waned by 2012, he had been a liaison to the SAF in the 1990s and had helped organize LRA trips to Kafia Kingi after the launch of Operation Lightning Thunder. Lancaster, Lacaille, Cakaj, “Diagnostic Study,” 2011.
89 Ugandan and US military forces suspended counter-LRA operations in CAR in March 2013 in the aftermath of the Seleka rebel coup in Bangui. They remained officially suspended at the time this report went to press. Biryabarema, Elias, “Uganda suspends hunt for warlord...
Turning a blind eye towards Kafia Kingi

The mix of military pressure and intensive defections outreach that the international counter-LRA coalition has invested in so heavily in CAR is of limited use in addressing the LRA’s periodic presence in Kafia Kingi, however. Sudan is not a full participant in the RCI-LRA and has not given AU RTF troops permission to operate in its territory. Instead, Khartoum has allowed the LRA periodic safe haven in Kafia Kingi while consistently denying reports of LRA presence there and refusing to cooperate fully with AU and UN officials seized of the matter.90

Despite this, regional and international leaders have taken only tentative steps thus far to engage Sudan on the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi, which was first reported publicly as early as March 2010.91 Ugandan and South Sudanese officials have periodically accused Khartoum of harboring LRA fighters since then, but they have not provided significant public evidence to back their claims nor succeeded in constructively engaging Sudan on the issue.92

The international community first began to address the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi in 2012. In July 2012, when the UN Security Council renewed its authorization for the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), it included new language calling for coordination and information sharing amongst all UN missions in the region, including the AU/UN Hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).93 Later that month, several Council members tabled a proposal for the UNAMID mandate itself to be amended with similar language. In response, Sudan threatened to undermine UNAMID’s work in Darfur if the Security Council accepted the proposal.94 After lobbying by China and Russia, Sudan’s closest allies on the Council, the language was watered down but still included.95

While UNAMID’s area of mandated operation includes Kafia Kingi, the peacekeeping force does not maintain any permanent presence within the enclave, though they visit on an as-needed basis. UNAMID’s limited investigations in Kafia Kingi have not produced evidence of LRA presence, but it has yet to undertake a comprehensive investigation in the remote areas in which the LRA has operated.96

Efforts by AU officials have similarly failed to produce definitive results. In October 2012, AU Envoy Ambassador Francisco Madeira traveled to Khartoum to discuss reports of LRA presence in Kafia Kingi with Sudanese government officials. Sudanese officials reportedly provided mixed responses and did not commit to any concrete steps to follow up on the concerns raised by Madeira.97

In December 2012, the UN Secretary General referenced “growing concern” regarding increased reports of LRA presence in Kafia Kingi.98 The Security Council echoed these

94 Sudanese Ambassador to the UN Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman is quoted as saying, “Including this issue is going to be an impediment and cause of refusal, which may affect our cooperation with UNAMID and its actions in Darfur... Those who support that position will be responsible for the consequences stemming there from.” Sudan Tribune, “Sudan warns Security Council,” 2012.
96 The Resolve interview with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations official, New York, USA, 26 July 2012.
97 The Resolve interviews with AU officials, Washington, DC, November 2012.
98 Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on
concerns in a follow-up statement later that month, but neither provided guidance for action by UN agencies or other actors to address those concerns. 99

Toward a more constructive role for Sudan

Securing Sudan’s cooperation in counter-LRA efforts may yet be possible, especially because the LRA is not as valuable to Sudan as it was as a proxy to the SAF in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The LRA is much weaker than it was then, and no evidence has emerged indicating that Sudanese officials are supplying the LRA with significant new arms or planning to use it as a proxy to destabilize South Sudan. More likely, Sudan’s renewed links to the LRA provide a source of leverage for the government’s efforts to convince the Ugandan and South Sudanese governments to end their support for Sudanese rebel groups. 100

These dynamics suggest that an appropriate mix of political incentives and pressure could convince the Sudanese government to definitively end its decades-long collaboration with the rebel group. Among international actors, the AU is best positioned to lead direct engagement with Sudan and secure its cooperation with regional counter-LRA efforts. Through the RCI-LRA, it already plays a key role in convening LRA-affected governments to improve regional cooperation in counter-LRA efforts.

The AU has also established itself as one of the most trusted international interlocutors with the Sudanese government. The AUHIP, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, is facilitating negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan on a host of issues, including border security. The AU also plays a key role in addressing ongoing conflicts in Sudan’s Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile regions. Furthermore, it is helping to facilitate the political transition in CAR, which suffered a coup in March 2013 that further destabilized the remote northeastern region of the country that shares a border with Kafia Kingi.

However, engagement with Sudan is likely to fail without leadership at the highest levels of the AU. Ambassador Madeira, despite his best efforts, needs additional political backing to gain real concessions from Sudan. Meanwhile, President Mbeki’s team is unlikely to make the LRA a priority. Though Sudan could still try to use the weakened LRA as a proxy against South Sudan, the LRA has not perpetrated any attacks in South Sudan in over a year, making it a relatively minor security concern compared to threats in other areas of the country.

Instead, the AU, which authorized its regional cooperation initiative on the LRA in November 2011, should establish a new track of international engagement with Sudan focused specifically on the LRA. The AU-led engagement with Sudan should focus on two core goals. First, it should seek to establish transparent mechanisms to investigate reports of LRA movements in Kafia Kingi and Sudanese-controlled areas. Second, it should secure Khartoum’s agreement to cease any support to LRA rebels and to either directly apprehend LRA commanders who venture into Sudanese-controlled territory or allow forces authorized under the RCI-LRA to do so.

The Chairperson of the AU Commission, South African diplomat Dr. Dlamini Zuma, should work with Ambassador Madeira and leaders of LRA-affected countries to develop a common diplomatic strategy employing a mix of political incentives and pressure aimed at achieving these two goals. To encourage this, the AU Peace and Security Council should request a briefing about evidence of Sudanese support to the LRA in advance of its upcoming reauthorization of the RCI-LRA and explicitly call for cooperation from Sudan in the reauthorization resolution.
To succeed, the AU and LRA-affected countries will also need substantial support from the UN and other members of the international community. UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios, who is a key international interlocutor with the Sudan government, should engage directly with officials there to urge an end to their ties to the LRA. In its next statement on the issue, the UN Security Council should express concern about the LRA’s periodic presence in Kafia Kingi and demand Sudanese cooperation in regional efforts to end LRA atrocities. Moreover, the Council should urge UNAMID, as well as the Panel of Experts for Sudan and Group of Experts for Congo, to follow through on their mandates to investigate Sudanese support to the LRA.

Western donors, such as the US and European countries, have limited political capital with the Sudanese government. However, they can press the AU to address the matter and engage Sudan bilaterally within their own capacities. Moreover, the US should leverage its recently announced rewards of up to five million dollars for information that leads to the arrest of Joseph Kony, Dominic Ongwen, and Okot Odhiambo to obtain information about LRA movements in and around Kafia Kingi that can be shared with the AU and regional governments.101

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101 For instance, the US could use funds designated to promote the rewards to rehabilitate FM radio stations in communities surrounding Kafia Kingi, such as Raga in South Sudan and Sam Ouandja in CAR. Stations in these communities could then broadcast messages into Kafia Kingi and surrounding areas, encouraging LRA fighters in the area to return home and advertising the availability of the rewards. For information on the rewards program, see US Department of State, “Expansion of the War Crimes Rewards Program,” Special Briefing by Stephen J. Rapp and Donald Yamamoto, 3 April 2013, accessed 18 April 2013.
APPENDIX A. MAP AND DETAILED TIMELINE OF REPORTED LRA ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND THE KAFIA KINGI ENCLAVE, 2009-2013
2009

JULY 2009 | Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (WBeG State), South Sudan

An LRA delegation attempts to travel to Kafia Kingi to reestablish ties with the SAF. They make it as far as Western Bahr el-Ghazal before turning back to CAR after a clash with SPLA forces.

JULY 2009 | Congo

After surrendering to Ugandan military forces in Congo on 3 November 2009, senior LRA commander Charles Arop claims in debriefings with UN officials that LRA leader Joseph Kony had summoned him in July 2009 to meet at a rendezvous point in northern CAR and then travel together into South Darfur.

OCTOBER 2009 | Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1

According to two LRA defectors who were eyewitnesses, an LRA group led by Otto Agweng arrives in the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave in early October 2009, making it the first LRA group to successfully travel there. Agweng makes contact with the SAF outpost at Dafak, which lies near the Umbelasha River in Kafia Kingi. He is reportedly under orders to arrange a safe haven for LRA leader Joseph Kony.

15 DECEMBER 2009 | Boro Medina, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #2

Suspected LRA forces reportedly led by Otto Agweng attack Boro Medina, a small village in Raga County of Western Bahr el-Ghazal state in South Sudan. Thirteen people are abducted to carry goods that were looted from multiple shops.

19 DECEMBER 2009 | Boro Medina, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #2

SPLA forces claim to clash with suspected LRA combatants at a hideout near Boro Medina. Four LRA members are reportedly killed, while four South Sudanese soldiers are reportedly injured and one other killed. LRA combatants flee towards CAR after the attack.

2010

8 JANUARY 2010 | Boro Medina, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #2

A joint UPDF and SPLA tracking team follows an LRA group reportedly led by Otto Agweng south of Boro Medina. The team reports sighting a white helicopter with UN markings landing where they thought the LRA group was located. When the team reaches the site where the helicopter touched down, they find discarded food and medicine packages. The Ugandan military later confirmed with UN officials that the helicopter was not with a UN agency or peacekeeping mission in the region.

23 JULY 2010 | Yubulu, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #3

LRA forces attack the town of Yubulu, along the Raga-Wau road in Western Bahr el-Ghazal. They first enter the compound of the local chief, looting food, clothes, and other household items. They then kill an elderly man next door and abduct two girls (15 and 13 years old) and a young boy (15 years old).

26 JULY 2010 | 35km South of Koro, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #4

LRA fighters reportedly clash with the Ugandan military thirty-five kilometers south of Koro, in Western Bahr el-Ghazal.

27 JULY 2010 | Yubulu, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #3

An LRA fighter surrenders in Yubulu.

LATE 2010 | Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1

According to two LRA defectors, an LRA delegation led by Kony arrives at Dafak around September 2010 and meets with SAF representatives. Kony reportedly orders fighters to bring food to LRA camps in Kafia Kingi, and LRA groups launched several looting raids on communities across the border in CAR in September and October (see below). Kony and his group then allegedly depart Kafia Kingi by December, leaving Capt. Otim Ferry in charge of a group of LRA fighters that remains in Kafia Kingi near Dafak. After leaving the enclave, Kony travels south into eastern CAR, and even
briefly back into northeastern Congo.

3 SEPTEMBER 2010 | Soungou, Aftina and Kpengbele; Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #5

The LRA reportedly abducts fifty-two people in coordinated attacks on the towns of Soungou, Aftina, and Kpengbele in CAR, during which they also loot food and money. LRA forces release ten abductees the same day they were abducted.

6-7 SEPTEMBER 2010 | Ouanda Djalle, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #6

LRA forces reportedly attack Ouanda Djalle, CAR, burning dozens of homes and abducting thirty-six people. The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), a Central African rebel group based in the area, pursues the LRA attackers. In the subsequent clash, many of the abductees are able to escape. The next morning LRA forces return and kill two civilians and exchange fire with the CAR military, then leave the area.

11 SEPTEMBER 2010 | Ouanda Djalle, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #6

In response to the attack on Ouanda Djalle, members of the UFDR and a local self-defense group reportedly track and pursue a group of LRA combatants. These combined forces are reportedly then ambushed by the LRA.

27 SEPTEMBER 2010 | Koumbal, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #7

LRA members reportedly attack Koumbal, CAR, and abduct seven people.

30 SEPTEMBER 2010 | Tiroungoulou, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #8

LRA forces reportedly attack Tiroungoulou, CAR and abduct multiple people. One person is beaten to death by the LRA. Members of the UFDR counter-attack, reportedly killing two LRA combatants and wounding ten more.

3 OCTOBER 2010 | Mandoua, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #9

LRA forces reportedly attack Mandoua, CAR, and abduct three people.

4 OCTOBER 2010 | Tiroungoulou, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #8

LRA fighters reportedly attack a local militia base in Tiroungoulou, CAR. Four LRA are reportedly killed.

10 OCTOBER 2010 | Birao, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #10

LRA forces reportedly attack the town of Birao, CAR, abduct twenty-three people, including five children, and loot the main market.

26 OCTOBER 2010 | Koumbal, Vakaga Prefecture, CAR | Map #7

LRA forces reportedly attack Koumbal, CAR, and abduct four people. The LRA also loots goods from the village.

2011

14 JULY 2011 | Deim Zubeir, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #12

An LRA group abducts a school headmaster working in his fields south of Deim Zubeir, a small town on the Wau-Raga road.

16 JULY 2011 | Sopo, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #13

Two days after abducting the school headmaster near Deim Zubeir, the LRA attacks Sopo, the next town on the road going towards Raga. The group abducts one 15-year-old child and loots clothes, money, and food.

AUGUST 2011 | LRA camp near Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1

An LRA combatant from Capt. Otim Ferry’s remnant LRA group in Kafia Kingi defects from the LRA and is later taken into custody by authorities in CAR.

EARLY SEPTEMBER 2011 | Deim Jallab, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #14

LRA forces attack Deim Jallab, a small
town between Raga and Boro Medina. After entering the town and disarming the policeman, LRA forces loot food and three AK-47s and abduct two children. These two children escape three days later.

**17 SEPTEMBER 2011 | Raga, WBeG State, South Sudan | Map #11**

Ugandan forces reportedly clash with LRA forces sixty-four kilometers southwest of Raga, South Sudan, killing four LRA combatants and capturing two.

**OCTOBER 2011 | LRA camp near Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1**

Kony arrives in Kafia Kingi, rendezvousing with Capt. Ferry’s remnant LRA group. Since Kony’s departure from Kafia Kingi in late 2010, Capt. Ferry’s group had maintained regular contact with SAF personnel in Dafak, constructed several small tukuls, and travelled periodically to the market town of Songo in South Darfur State. After Kony’s arrival, the LRA establishes semipermanent LRA encampments approximately seventeen kilometers southwest of the SAF’s Dafak outpost.

**2012**

**JANUARY-MARCH 2012 | Songo, South Darfur State | Map #15**

Unconfirmed reports indicate that LRA forces continue to travel periodically to the market town of Songo, to the east of Dafak, accompanied by SAF representatives.

**7 MARCH 2012 | Yangou-Pendere, Haute Kotto Prefecture, CAR | Map #16**

A group of LRA combatants ambush thirteen people along the road from Sam Ouandja to Yangou-Pendere in CAR’s Haute Kotto district on 7 March, looting their goods and tying them together with rope. All of the abductees except one escape the next morning. The LRA group attacks the village of Yangou-Pendere the following day, abducting one more person and burning several homes.

**LATE 2012 | LRA camp near Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1**

Okema, one of Kony’s bodyguards, defects from the LRA and provides further details about the presence of Kony and other senior LRA commanders in Kafia Kingi.

**2013**

**JANUARY 2013 | 280km north of Djemah, CAR | Map #17**

Ugandan military forces kill senior LRA commander Binany and one of Kony’s bodyguards 280km north of Djemah, near the border with Kafia Kingi. Binany had recently departed from LRA camps in Kafia Kingi and may have been travelling to Congo. Items found on the bodies of both Binany and the second fighter provide detailed information about the location of Kony’s camps in Kafia Kingi.

**MARCH 2013 | LRA camp near Dafak, Kafia Kingi | Map #1**

Satellite imagery analysis indicates that the LRA abandons their likely encampment along the Umbelasha River sometime between February and March 2013.
From January to April 2013, at the request of this report’s authors, Amnesty International USA commissioned DigitalGlobe, a commercial imagery provider, to conduct satellite imagery analysis of reported areas of LRA activity within the Kafia Kingi enclave. DigitalGlobe’s imagery and analysis show that between November 2011 and March 2013, an encampment was established along the Umbelasha River approximately seventeen kilometers southwest of the Sudanese military garrison at Dafak. The timeline of the camp’s creation, its rough location, and its physical characteristics aligned with reports from LRA defectors and other sources, who also indicated that LRA leader Joseph Kony was based at the camp for parts of 2011 and 2012 and possibly early 2013.

According to DigitalGlobe analysts, the first sign of human activity in the area was detected in November 2011, when imagery shows burned grasslands in areas where crops are later visible. By March 2012, six thatched huts—called tukuls—are visible in a central camp, with tents and other makeshift structures visible in three surrounding camps, each next to cultivated plots of land. The total area of the encampments comprises approximately one-half of a square kilometer.

Evidence of human activity in the camps is visible throughout 2012, peaking in late 2012 and early 2013. The camps were abandoned between 15 February and 17 March 2013, with many structures burned or dismantled.

Index of images:
- Figure 1: This satellite image from March 2012 shows where the LRA likely developed an encampment on the banks of the Umbelasha River, approximately seventeen kilometers southwest of a Sudanese military garrison within the Kafia Kingi enclave. © DigitalGlobe 2013
- Figure 2: This image, also from March 2012, zooms in on the rectangular area highlighted in Figure 1 and shows semipermanent structures being built, presumably to shelter LRA members. © DigitalGlobe 2013
- Figure 3: The camp reached peak activity in December 2012 during harvest season. There are four separate areas with structures; only one central encampment features tukuls while the surrounding camps feature tents and other makeshift structures. © DigitalGlobe 2013
- Figure 4: The tukuls measure 6 meters in diameter, while the smaller tent-like structures measure approximately 1.5 meters by 4 meters. © DigitalGlobe 2013
- Figure 5: Side-by-side imagery from December 2012 and March 2013 shows that the camp was abandoned by March 2013. © DigitalGlobe 2013

102 All imagery and analysis included in this section are provided courtesy of Amnesty International USA’s Science for Human Rights Program, as commissioned from DigitalGlobe. “Farm Complex in the Kafia Kingi Enclave,” April 10, 2013. All images © DigitalGlobe 2013

103 The Resolve phone call with LRA expert, January 2013; corroborated by testimony from former members of the LRA previously present in Kafia Kingi, as well as government and civilian sources from CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda regarding the physical attributes of the camp, including its approximate distance from the SAF Dafak garrison and its proximity to the Umbelasha River.
**Figure 1:** This satellite image from March 2012 shows where the LRA likely developed an encampment on the banks of the Umbelasha River, approximately seventeen kilometers southwest of a Sudanese military garrison within the Kafia Kingi enclave. © DigitalGlobe 2013
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